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Abstract
The Peter principle has been recently investigated by means of an agent-based
simulation and its validity has been numerically corroborated. It has been confirmed
that, within certain conditions, it can really influence in a negative way the efficiency
of a pyramidal organization adopting meritocratic promotions. It was also found
that, in order to bypass these effects, alternative promotion strategies should be
adopted, as for example a random selection choice. In this paper, within the same
line of research, we study promotion strategies in a more realistic hierarchical and
modular organization and we show the robustness of our previous results, extending
their validity to a more general context. We discuss also why the adoption of these
strategies could be useful for real organizations.
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1 Introduction
Promotion strategies are fundamental for a hierarchical organization, being
this a scientific group, a company, a public administration, a cluster of com-
puters or a group of animals. They are important to understand the dynamics
of a pyramidal system and eventually provide ways to improve its efficiency.
It is not strange that also physicists are working in this direction. In fact in
the last years physicists have started to collaborate with economists and social
scientists in order to get a more quantitative understanding of social sciences
mechanisms [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Actually, it is by now largely accepted that, even in
social sciences, simple schematic models and computer simulations inspired by
statistical physics are able to take into account unexpected collective behav-
iors of large groups of individuals, discovering emergent features independent
of their individual psychological attributes, which are very often counterintu-
itive and difficult to predict just following common sense. Along these lines,
by means of an agent-based simulation approach [7,8,9,10,11], we study here
the effects of the Peter principle [12] within a very general context where dif-
ferent promotions strategies are investigated in order to maximize the global
efficiency in a given hierarchical system. In a paper published before [13] we
have already studied this phenomenon within a pyramidal organization, show-
ing its validity under certain conditions, and we have tested several strategies
in order to bypass its negative effects. In this paper we investigate in deeper
detail a more complex modular organization, also endowed of new realistic
features, in order to test these different promotion strategies under the Peter
hypothesis and their influence in maximizing the global efficiency of the sys-
tem, considering also the individual expectations of its members in terms of
career progressions. In particular we study the gain in efficiency due to both
the organization topology (modular or pyramidal) and the introduction of a
variable percentage of random promotions after a meritocratic transient. The
paper is organized as follows. In section 2, after a brief summary of our pre-
vious results, we present the details of the more realistic new model adopted
in the present paper and we compare the old pyramidal topology with the
new modular one. In section 3 we describe the new simulation results. Then
a general discussion is addressed in section 4, where the real applicability of
these strategies is also presented and finally some conclusions are drawn in
section 5.
2 The extended hierarchical organization model
We present in this section the details of the new hierarchical organization
model adopted in this paper, in order to test in more realistic situations the
effects of the Peter principle and the possible strategies to contrast it. However,
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Fig. 1. Schematic view of the simple pyramidal model studied in our previous
paper[13]. Beside each level, the corresponding value of responsibility (increasing
linearly from the bottom to the top) is also reported. We show in yellow the empty
positions for which promotions are required.
before illustrating the new model, we summarize the results obtained in our
previous paper [13].
2.1 Previous results about the Pyramidal model
In our previous paper we studied the schematic pyramidal model shown in
Fig.1. The main features of this model are summarized below.
(1) We considered a hierarchical pyramidal organization with 160 positions
divided into six levels. Each level has a different number of members
(which decreases, climbing the hierarchy) with a different responsibility,
i.e. with a different weight on the global efficiency (see below) of the or-
ganization. The members of the organization have only two features: an
age (ranging from 18 to 60 years) and a degree of competence (ranging
from 1 to 10 and indicated by a color with intensity proportional to the
competence). As initial conditions we selected ages and competences fol-
lowing normal distributions with, respectively, average 25 (with standard
deviation 5) and average 7 (with standard deviation 2);
(2) At each time step, members with an age over the retirement threshold (
fixed at 60 years) or with a competence lower than the dismissal thresh-
old (fixed at 4) leave the organization (their color becomes yellow) and
someone from the level immediately below (or from outside for level 6)
will be chosen for promotion, see Fig.1;
(3) Four different competing strategies of promotions have been proposed.
A first strategy consists in promoting the best worker, a second one in
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Fig. 2. A schematic summary of the results found in our previous paper [13], see
text.
promoting the worst, a third one considers the promotion of a random
worker and a fourth one alternate the promotion of the best and the
worst;
(4) For each promotion at the upper level, two different mechanisms of com-
petence transmission have been considered. 1) Common Sense (CS): if
the features required from one level to the upper are enough stable, the
new competence at the upper level is correlated with the previous one
and the agent maintains his competence with a small error; 2) Peter Hy-
pothesis (PH): if the features required from one level to the upper can
change considerably, the new competence at the upper level is NOT cor-
related with the previous one, so the new competence is again randomly
assigned from a normal distribution, as happens in a new engagement;
(5) A parameter, called global efficiency E, is calculated by summing the
competences of the members level by level, multiplied by the level-dependent
factor of responsibility, ranging from 0 to 1 and linearly increasing on
climbing the hierarchy. The result is normalized to its maximum possible
value Max(E) and to the total number of agents N, so that the global ef-
ficiency (E) can be expressed as a percentage. Therefore, if Ci is the total
competence of level i-th, the resulting expression for the global efficiency
is
E(%) =
∑
6
i=1Ciri
Max(E) ·N
· 100, (1)
being Max(E) =
∑
6
i=1(10 · ni) · ri/N , where ni is the number of agents
of level i-th
The main results found in our previous paper are summarized in the his-
togram of Fig.2, where the asymptotic efficiency gain, calculated with respect
to a common but arbitrary initial state and averaged over many different re-
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Fig. 3. Hierarchical tree networks with different coordination number L and size
N : for L = 3 N = 121, for L = 4 N = 341, for L = 5 N = 781 and for L = 6
N = 1555.
alizations of the initial conditions, is reported as function of the hypothesis
adopted and of the promotion strategy applied. In particular we found that
(1) promoting the best member is a winning strategy only if the CS hy-
pothesis holds, otherwise is a loosing one - for this reason we also define
the strategy ”The best” coupled with the Peter hypothesis as ”naively”
meritocratic;
(2) on the contrary, if the PH holds, the best strategy is that one of promoting
the worst member;
(3) but if one does not know which of the two hypothesis holds, then adopting
a random promotion strategy, or alternating the promotion of the best
and the worst, results to be always a winning choice.
The previous results are not straightforward nor immediately intuitive, since
at a first sight they seem to contradict common sense; moreover they were
obtained through a very simple toy model which could seem a very peculiar
example. Therefore, although the paper was very successful and appreciated
also for its simplicity - it was quoted by several blogs and specialized news-
papers, among which the MIT blog, the New York Times and the Financial
Times, and it was also awarded the IG Nobel prize 2010 for ”Management” [14]
- further investigations within a more realistic model were certainly desirable.
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2.2 The new Hierarchical Tree model
In order to test the robustness and the general validity of the increase in
efficiency triggered by random strategies, we improved our agent based model
by introducing several new features which provide a more realistic scenario.
First of all we consider a more complex topology for modeling a schematic
modular organization, i.e. a hierarchical tree network with K = 5 levels, where
each agent (node) at levels k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (excluding the bottom level with
k = 5) has exactly L first subordinates (i.e. first neighbors at level k+1), which
will fill that position when it will become empty. An analogous structure has
been used in a recent paper concerning a Dilbert-Peter model of organization
effectiveness [15]. We can call L the coordination number of the network. This
means that, at variance with the pyramidal schematic model of our first paper,
in this case promoted agents follow the links to ascend through levels. On the
other hand, neglecting the links and promoting agents from the entire level
k to the next level k − 1, one recovers the pyramidal model as a particular
case. For a given value of K and L, the total number N of agents of such a
hierarchical network is given by
N =
LK − 1
L− 1
. (2)
In the following we fix K = 5 and vary L. In this case, each agent with k < 5
has exactly Nk = (L
6−k − L)/(L − 1) subordinates in all the levels below. In
Fig.3 we show four examples of hierarchical tree networks with K = 5 levels
and an increasing coordination number L: for L = 3 we obtain a network with
N = 121 agents, for L = 4 N = 341, for L = 5 N = 781 and for L = 6
N = 1555. The responsibility value is 0.2 for the bottom level and increases
linearly, like in the previous model, with step 0.2 for each level up to the top
one, whose responsibility value is 1. Such a modular structure is surely more
suitable than the simple pyramidal one to describe realistic sales divisions in
large corporations or project teams in government institutions [15].
The second main improvement concerns the time units adopted in the simu-
lations. In our previous model we adopted one year as time unit, therefore all
the dynamical features of the algorithm (retirements, dismissals, promotions
or new engagements) were updated at the end of each year. Now we enlarge
the time resolution by using one month as unit. This means that the age of
all the agents increases of one unit (one year) every 12 time steps, but all
the dynamical features are now updated every month. In such a way we will
be able to follow the dynamics of the organization over a more realistic and
detailed time scale.
In order to make the dynamics independent of the initial conditions, instead
of studying gains and losses with respect to an arbitrary initial state for the
organization (with an arbitrary value of the initial global efficiency, as done in
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[13]), we will refer here to a relative global efficiency Er(%), calculated with
respect to a fixed transient during which a naively meritocratic strategy (i.e.
promotions of ”The best” coupled with Peter hypothesis) is always applied.
The introduction of such a transient also allows us to simulate organizations
which have already reached their stationary state, since we are not particularly
interested in newly founded companies but in existing average-size companies.
Another important improvement concerns the details of random promotions.
Since it is understandable that a real company would initially be hesitant in
adopting tout court random promotions as a long term strategy, it is worth-
while to investigate how much randomness is effectively needed in order to see
as soon as possible some relevant improvement after the meritocratic transient.
Therefore we introduce a new ”Mixed” strategy, where a different increasing
percentage of random promotions with respect to ”The best” one is considered.
Of course a ”Mixed” strategy with 0% of random promotions corresponds to
a full ”The best” strategy, while a ”Mixed” strategy with 100% of random
promotions corresponds to a full ”Random” strategy.
Finally, as already anticipated, we have also considered the possibility to pro-
mote a member from one level to the next without considering the links of
the hierarchical tree, in order to reduce the new model to that one consid-
ered in ref. [13]: this last mode of promotion is, from here on, called global
mode and refers to the old pyramidal topology, while the neighbors mode is
the promotion mode which follows the links of the full modular network.
3 New Simulation Results
We present in the following the results of simulations performed with the new
hierarchical model just introduced. First of all let us try to reproduce the old
results shown in Fig.2 within this new model, focusing our attention (i) on the
influence of the topology on those results and (ii) on the competition between
the ”Random” strategy and ”The best” strategy under the Peter hypothesis
of competence transmission.
3.1 Comparison between the old and the new model
In Fig.4 we plot the time evolution of the relative global efficiency Er(%) for
the hierarchical tree networks showed in Fig.3, but in the ’global’ mode, i.e.
without considering the links: it is a situation equivalent to the old pyramidal
topology showed in Fig.1, only with a different increasing size. For each net-
work, we adopt a mixed strategy of promotions, with an increasing percentage
of random promotions and coupled with the Peter hypothesis (PH). Results
are averaged over 30 events, i.e. runs with different realizations of the initial
7
0 250 500 750 1000
months
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
R
el
at
iv
e 
G
lo
ba
l E
ffi
cie
nc
y 
(%
)
0 250 500 750 1000
months
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
R
el
at
iv
e 
G
lo
ba
l E
ffi
cie
nc
y 
(%
)
0 250 500 750 1000
months
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
R
el
at
iv
e 
G
lo
ba
l E
ffi
cie
nc
y 
(%
)
0 250 500 750 1000
months
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
R
el
at
iv
e 
G
lo
ba
l E
ffi
cie
nc
y 
(%
)
0%
25%
50%
L=5 - N=781
100%
L=4 - N=341
L=6 - N=1555
100%
75%
75%
50%
25%
0%
L=3 - N=121
100%
75%
50%
25%
0% 0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Fig. 4. Time evolution of the relative global efficiency Er(%) for four hierarchical
tree networks with increasing coordination numbers, after a meritocratic transient
(not reported in the panels). An average over 30 realizations was done. For each
plot, assuming the Peter hypothesis for competence transmission, a mixed strategy
of promotion was adopted with an increasing percentage of random promotions with
respect to ”The best” strategy - reported beside the panels. The simulations were
performed in ’global’ mode, i.e. each network is reduced to a simple pyramid where
an empty position at level k can be filled by any agent at level k + 1, as in the old
model [13].
conditions. As previously mentioned, each simulation starts with a merito-
cratic transient of 1000 months (not plotted in Fig.4), which is long enough to
reach a stationary state for the global efficiency. Immediately after the tran-
sient the various percentages of random promotions are introduced and for
the next 1000 months we report, in each panel of Fig.4, the relative global ef-
ficiency Er(%) for the correspondent organization, calculated as the difference
between the actual absolute efficiency E(%) and the efficiency Etrans(%) cal-
culated averaging along the stationary state of the transient. In other words,
Er(%) measures the gain or loss in efficiency with respect to the ’naively’
meritocratic regime (whose reference value, corresponding to Er(%) = 0, is
indicated with a dashed line in all the plots).
We immediately see that an increase in the percentage of random promotions
(reported on the right at the end of each curve) yields a gain in efficiency
for all the organizations, although in general the asymptotic values of Er(%)
slightly diminish by increasing the size of the organization. Fluctuations in
the time evolution are also strongly suppressed by increasing the size of the
system, since they go from values around ±0.3% for the L = 3 case, to values
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Fig. 5. We show here simulations analogous to those shown in Fig.4 but obtained
with promotions in ’neighbors’ mode, i.e. an empty position at level k can be filled
only from first neighbors agents at level k + 1.
below ±0.1% for the L = 6 case. In any case these fluctuations do not affect
the general trend of the global efficiency and therefore the conclusions of our
analysis.
If one focus on the difference between the 100% curves (full ”Random” strate-
gies) and the 0% ones (full ”The best” strategies), this result confirms how
previously showed in Fig.2, where the difference in efficiency (about 8%) be-
tween the cases ”Random” + PH and ”The best” + PH is comparable with
that one obtained here for the L = 3 organization, the more similar in size
with the old pyramidal model. It is interesting to notice that the increase in
efficiency triggered by the random promotions (also if they are present in a
small percentage) is sudden and relevant immediately after the meritocratic
transient, even if the system reaches its stationary states only after twenty
years (240 months).
In Fig. 5 we illustrate simulations analogous to those presented in Fig.4, where
the time evolution of the relative global efficiency Er(%) has been calculated
for the same four hierarchical tree networks shown in Fig.4, but applying
the mixed strategy of promotions (again coupled with Peter hypothesis) in
’neighbors’ mode, i.e. promoting people by following the links for climbing the
hierarchy. The results show that the global efficiency is quite sensitive to the
topology of the organization, whose effect seems to be that of shrinking the
gap of gain between the full ”Random” strategy efficiency (100% curve) and
the meritocratic one (0% curve), for all the organization’s sizes (for the L = 3
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Fig. 6. Time evolution of the relative global efficiency (averaged over 30 events)
for the L = 4 hierarchical tree network. In the first row we report, for comparison,
the same plots of Fig.4 and Fig.5 for the L = 4 network, while in the second row
we show analogous plots but with the Common Sense (CS) hypothesis of competence
transmission for both ’global’ (left) and ’neighbors’ (right) mode. As expected, in this
case the introduction of a percentage of random promotions after the meritocratic
transient yields a decrease in efficiency, according to the results of Fig.2, but this
decrement is less in the case of the ”neighbors mode”, see text.
network the gap shrinks from the 8% of Fig.4 to 4%, even if it stays quite
constant increasing L). This would mean that, for a given organization, a hi-
erarchical tree topology with modules, groups and subordinates would allow
to reduce the effectiveness of random strategies in mitigating the effects of
Peter hypothesis with respect to the simple structure with global promotions
among levels. But this is only one half of the story. In fact if one observes the
absolute values of transient efficiency Etrans(%) (not reported in the figure),
it results that, regardless of L, it is always greater of about 3% in ’neighbors’
mode with respect to ’global’ mode. This can be explained by considering
that, during the meritocratic transient, the strategy of promoting each time
the agent with the highest competence penalizes organizations with pyramidal
topology (’global’ mode): in fact, in this case, the selection of the best agent
at level k is performed on a statistical sample with many more agents (Lk+1 to
be precise) than in the case of a network topology in ’neighbors’ mode (where
the selection is performed only over the L first neighbors), therefore the prob-
ability of promoting an agent with competence close to the maximum possible
value (10) is very much higher. And since each promotion implies a random
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change of competence, as imposed by the Peter hypothesis, such a statistical
effect produces, in the long term, a lower (in absolute value) transient effi-
ciency for the pyramidal topology. On the other hand, the hierarchical tree
networks in ’neighbors’ mode shows a greater transient efficiency but reduces
the gain in efficiency due to the introduction of random promotions after the
transient, as observed in Fig.5 (we will discuss this effect with more details in
the next section).
Finally, in Fig.6 we perform a last test in order to verify the consistency of
the new model with the old one also when the Common Sense hypothesis for
competence transmission is adopted after a meritocratic transient, again as
function of an increasing percentage of random promotions and for both the
’global’ and the ’neighbors’ mode. We consider here only the L = 4 network,
representing an organization with five levels and a total of 341 members, and
compare the behavior already shown in Fig.5 for this network under the Peter
hypothesis (PH, top panels) with the analogous results obtained now under
the Common Sense hypothesis (CS, bottom panels). It clearly appears, in
agreement with the results of Fig.2 for the limiting cases of 0% and 100% of
random promotions, that the evolution of the relative global efficiency Er(%),
averaged over 30 events, shows a sudden decrement in the CS regime when
even a small percentage of randomness is introduced in the promotion strategy.
This confirms the effectiveness of promoting the best members when the new
competence requested at level k is correlated with the old one requested at
level k+1. In this case the modular structure of the organization (’neighbors’
mode, right bottom panel) reduces the negative effects with respect to the
pyramidal one (’global’ mode, left bottom panel), therefore a complex topol-
ogy with project teams, managers and subordinates, is again recommended
for a real hierarchical organization also if Peter hypothesis does not hold.
3.2 Robustness of the random strategy gain
In order to better compare the total efficiency gain which takes into account
the contributions of both the topology and the random promotions, it is more
convenient to represent the results of the upper panels of Fig.6, concerning a
L = 4 network, in the form of a histogram, as shown in Fig.7. Here the global
efficiency in the ’global’ mode (on the left) corresponds to the asymptotic
efficiency gain due to the introduction of random promotions after the meri-
tocratic transient, while the global efficiency in the ’neighbors’ mode (on the
right) is calculated by taking as reference value the average transient efficiency
EGtrans(%) in the ’global’ mode (put equal to 0), and by adding the gain in
efficiency ENtrans(%)−EGtrans(%), evaluated at the end of the transient and
due to the modular topology (a gain which depends on the statistical effect
previously explained and stays here around 3%), to the asymptotic gain in effi-
ciency due to random promotions. Fluctuations around the average stationary
11
Fig. 7. Global efficiency gain for the L = 4 hierarchical tree network for an increas-
ing percentage of random promotions in both ’global’ and ’neighbors’ mode. The
different contribution due to the transient dynamics, with meritocratic promotions,
and to the introduction of random strategies, is emphasized (see text).
values are not visible in this representation, but they remain very small and
of the same order of those of the previous figures for the caseL = 4.
Within this new visualization it becomes evident that the modular complex
structure (’neighbors’ mode) is more convenient for a real organization (in
terms of efficiency) not only when the Peter hypothesis (PH) holds and one
adopts the strategy of promoting the best members (as happens during the
transient), but also when one adopts a percentage of random promotions less
than 100% (again under the PH). Only applying the full ”Random” strategy
the global efficiency seems to no longer depend on the topology. With this
last figure as reference, let us now test the robustness of the random strategy
gain with respect to the introduction of new realistic features to our model.
Of course we will introduce one feature at the time keeping fixed all the oth-
ers, in order to better emphasize the influence on the organization for a given
modification.
Simulations with age-dependent competences
In the previous section, as well as in our previous paper [13], the competence
of the various agents was considered fixed in time at the top of their respective
possibility. But in a more realistic situation one can imagine that the compe-
tence of a young employee would improve until a certain age and then slowly
diminishes until retirement. Furthermore, very often employees are frustrated
by a lack of promotion opportunities, and individual efficiency decreases when
an increase in age does not match with a proper career progression: such an
effect is known as the Prince Charles syndrome and has been already studied
also computationally [16].
It is therefore interesting to explore if the effectiveness of the random pro-
motion strategy holds when a competence variable in time with the age and
the position of the agents is introduced in our new model. In particular, we
introduced an increment of competence in time for each agent during the first
part of his career in the organization, independently from the level, up to an
age of 38 years, and a decrement of competence during the remaining part
12
Fig. 8. Global efficiency gain (averaged over 30 events) for the L = 4 hierarchical
tree network for an increasing percentage of random promotions in both ’global’
(left side) and ’neighbors’ (right side) mode. In these simulations we introduced an
annual increment of competence (+0.02 and +0.05) for each agent during the first
part of his career (independently from the level) up to an age of 38 years, and an
annual decrement of competence (−0.02/rk and −0.05/rk) during the remaining
part of career (see text for more details).
of career which, however, further decreases climbing the hierarchy in order to
take into account the Prince Charles syndrome (at the same age, the higher is
the level, the greater is the motivation to carry out own work with efficiency).
In Fig.8 we plot the global efficiency gain for a L = 4 network, in both ’global’
and ’neighbors’ mode, as function of an increasing percentage of random pro-
motions (under the PH) and for two different steps of increment/decrement of
competence. In the two upper panels we fix an annual competence increment
of +0.02 and an annual decrement of −0.02/rk, being rk the responsibility of
level k (which increases linearly with the levels, as reported in Fig.1), while
in the lower panels the annual increment is +0.05 and the annual decrement
−0.05/rk: in both the cases, from a comparison with Fig.7, it clearly appears
that this new feature does not affect sensitively the global efficiency, inde-
pendently of the topology. Actually, apart from a small general loss of ∼ 2%
observed in the lower plots, the gain induced by random promotions tends
to be confirmed for both the pyramidal and the modular structures of the
organization.
Organizations with nonlinear responsibility
In all the previous simulations, as already observed, the responsibility of the
five levels of the organization varies linearly from 0.2 to 1, but of course this is
13
Fig. 9. Global efficiency for the L = 3 and L = 4 hierarchical tree networks (aver-
aged, respectively, over 30 and 20 events), for an increasing percentage of random
promotions in both ’global’ and ’neighbors’ mode of Peter hypothesis. In order to
make more realistic the responsibility increment from the bottom to the top level, in
these simulations we adopted, instead of the usual linear scale, a non linear one, see
text for more details.
an arbitrary criterium and one could ask how the response of the system to the
introduction of random promotions could be affected by changing it. Actually,
since the responsibility of managers within a hierarchical organization could
be likely considered correlated with the total number of their subordinates
at the lower levels, it is probably more realistic to adopt a non linear scale
for the responsibility. In this respect we did some simulations in which the
responsibility rk of an agent at level k < 5 is equal to the total number of
his/her subordinates at all the levels below, i.e. Nk = L
6−k−L/L−1. For k = 5
we put rk = 1. The results are reported in Fig.9 for a L = 3 and a L = 4
organizations, in both ’global’ and ’neighbors’ modes and under the Peter
hypothesis of competence transmission. Again, also in this case, we observe a
positive reaction of the asymptotic global efficiency to the adoption of random
strategies, with a total gain that is independent of the topology only for full
random promotions, while for a percentage of randomness smaller than 100%
the contribute of topology becomes important and privileges the ’neighbors’
mode, i.e. a modular structure with respect to a pyramidal one. Anyway,
comparing the lower panels of Fig.9 with those of Fig.7, apart of a slight
decrease (∼ −1%) in transient efficiency for the ’neighbors’ mode, results are
very similar, therefore the choice of the responsibility scale does not appear to
affect so much the global efficiency of the system and the gain due to random
promotions.
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Fig. 10. Global efficiency (averaged over 30 events) for the L = 4 hierarchical
tree network in both ’global’ and ’neighbors’ mode and with a full (100%) random
strategy. In these cases we simulate an organization where a certain percentage of
positions are characterized by the Peter hypothesis (indicating no correlation between
competences before and after the promotion at those positions), while the remaining
ones are characterized by the Common Sense hypothesis (indicating a strong corre-
lation between competences before and after the promotion at those position). See
text for further details.
Mixed hypothesis for the transmission of competences
Let us now consider a situation that is probably very common in real organi-
zations, where often neither the Common Sense nor the Peter hypothesis of
competence transmission are always satisfied, individually, for all the positions.
Rather, we can suppose that, in many real cases, some particular positions in
the hierarchy will require, for the promoted agent, a small change in the task
to perform with respect to the previous level (CS), while other positions could
require very different skills (PH). In order to take into account also these
situations, in the next simulations we consider the possibility of having two
different kinds of positions randomly distributed over the organization, one
satisfying the PH and the other one the CS, but with a different probability.
In Fig.10 the behavior of the asymptotic global efficiency is reported for the
usual L = 4 organization (with linear responsibility scale) in both ’global’ and
’neighbors’ mode, now as function of an increasing percentage of PH positions.
As always, each simulation starts with a meritocratic transient characterized
by the promotion of the best members, after which we apply here a full (100%)
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Fig. 11. In the bottom panels we show the time evolution of the relative global ef-
ficiency for the L = 4 hierarchical tree network (averaged over 30 events), for an
increasing percentage of random promotions in ’neighbors’ mode of Peter hypothesis.
The novelty is the introduction of the possibility, for the organization, to change in
time its number of active positions. A contracting and an oscillating organizations
have been considered, respectively, on the left and on the right panels. Fluctuations
in efficiency are visible especially in the right panel, due to the sudden inversion of
tendency in the size oscillation.
random strategy of promotions. Notice that, at variance with the previous
simulations, here both the ENtrans(%) and EGtrans(%), and then the gain in
efficiency ENtrans(%)−EGtrans(%) due to the topology, may change depending
on the percentage of PH positions, since the latter is a structural feature which
affects also the transient dynamics. Furthermore, ENtrans(%)−EGtrans(%) can
now also be negative when the percentage of PH positions is lower than 50%,
since in that case the Common Sense hypothesis prevails in the organization
and the meritocratic transient benefits the ’global’ pyramidal topology with
respect to the ’neighbors’ one (for the same statistical effect which favors the
modular structure when the Peter hypothesis holds).
From Fig.10 we see that, for any topology, the application of the 100% ran-
dom promotion strategy produces positive effects only for organizations with
more than 50% of PH positions, while in the other cases promoting the best
members continues to be a winning strategy. This definitively clarifies that
adopting random promotions is not always a recommended strategy, but only
when in a given organization the Peter hypothesis holds for the majority of
the positions.
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Time-dependent size of the organization
Our last test concerns the introduction of the possibility to change in time
the size of the organization. Actually, in the previous simulations, the total
number of active positions in the organizations was kept fixed in time, but this
constraint could be considered not very realistic since companies can decrease
or increase the number of their employees in time following periods of crisis
or expansion. Therefore we tried to explore the effects of the introduction of
a given percentage of random promotions in a contracting or in an oscillating
modular L = 4 organization (in ’neighbors’ mode, under the Peter hypoth-
esis) after a meritocratic transient during which the size is held constant in
time. The results of the simulations are shown in Fig.11. First of all we let
the organization contract in time by dismissing its members with a rate of
3 positions every 12 months, as shown in the left top panel, where the per-
centage of active positions (i.e. te level of occupancy) is plotted as function of
time; correspondently, in the panel below we plot the behavior of the relative
global efficiency for three different percentages of random promotions. The in-
troduction of even a small percentage of random promotions quickly enhances
the relative efficiency also during a period of crisis. The same behavior can
be found in the plots on the right side of Fig.1, where we let the number of
active positions of the organization oscillate in time with a dismissal rate of 5
positions every 3 months, as shown in the top panel. Again, random strategies
(and in particular the full 100% one) seem to be still more effective than the
others, as shown in the panel below. In general we also see that the effect of
reducing the size improves the efficiency while an expansion reduces it, un-
til, with an occupancy under the 40%, even the meritocratic strategy with
0% random promotions improves the efficiency of the organization (but, in
any case, less than the random one). Therefore also these simulations further
confirm the robustness of the full random strategy, which can be definitively
considered as the more effective for any complex organization, pyramidal or
modular, for which the Peter hypothesis applies.
4 General discussion
In this section we will try to summarize the results of our simulations pre-
sented previously and discuss the possible application in real cases. In all the
examples we have presented, a common feature strongly emerges: the efficiency
of an organization increases significantly if one adopts a random strategy of
promotion with respect to a simple meritocratic promotion of the best mem-
bers. This fact, already shown in our previous paper [13] for a very simple
pyramidal model and under a minimum number of assumptions, has proven
to be very robust and persistent even in a new hierarchical tree model and
under many different kinds of realistic improvements.
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Actually, the finding of the effectiveness of random promotions is not com-
pletely new. In fact, we have recently discovered that some years ago two re-
searchers of the Dallas School of Management, Texas (US), published a study
of management in real companies through computer simulations and found
that promotion of best performers may actually degrade the overall organiza-
tional performance when compared with just promoting a random member of
the group [17]. But, since they introduced random promotions as a baseline
control system, they were very surprised of this unexpected result, which in
any case was not connected at all to the Peter principle and, as far as we
know, they did not returned on the subject with further investigations. On
the contrary, in our simulations the random strategy has been introduced from
the beginning as a real alternative strategy to the meritocratic one, and the
increase of efficiency triggered by random promotions has been identified as an
emergent feature which comes out because of the cooperative effect of many
promotion events under the Peter hypothesis. In this respect, our new results
corroborate the fact that one does not need a full random strategy to obtain
an increase of efficiency: in many cases a choice of only 50% of agents selected
in a random way for promotion results to be enough to obtain a consistent
increment in the efficiency. Furthermore, in all cases discussed the random
strategy improves consistently the efficiency of the system revealing a very
persistent robustness.
4.1 Considerations about the first 20 years
The simulations presented in the previous section were performed for a period
of 1000 months (about 83 years). This period could seem too long to be consid-
ered realistic also for a real organization which wants to establish a long-term
strategy of promotions. But, on the other hand, the improvement in efficiency
induced by the random strategy after the transient has been shown to be rapid
and substantial since the very beginning (1% after 3 years, 2% after 6 years
and so on) and usually the global efficiency reaches a stationary state just
after 20 years. In order to discuss in deeper detail this point we emphasize in
Fig.12 the initial part of the efficiency time evolution for a hierarchical organi-
zation with K = 5, L = 4 and N = 341, considering an increasing percentage
of random promotions for both a pyramidal (’global’) and modular (’neigh-
bors’) topology under the Peter hypothesis of competence transmission. In
particular, we focus on a period of 240 months (20 years) and we also per-
form an average over 30 different realizations in order to diminish the effect
of fluctuations. The simulations strongly indicate that, independently of the
topology and of the percentage of random promotions, in the first 20 years
the global efficiency reaches values which are equal to about the 75% − 80%
of the asymptotic values shown in the upper panels of Fig.6. In Tables 1 and
2 we report detailed information concerning all the relevant quantities which
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Fig. 12. A magnification of the initial evolution of Figs.4,5 that shows an immediate
increase of the efficiency since the beginning of the adoption of a random strategy
with respect to a meritocratic one with the Peter hypothesis, see text for further
details.
characterize the organization considered in Fig.12 during the 20 years.
In particular, in Table 1 we report (from left to right), for both ’global’ (top)
and ’neighbors’ (bottom) modes and for each percentage of random promo-
tions, the following quantities: (i) the gain in efficiency accumulated during
the meritocratic transient (calculated with respect to the ’global’ mode, which
therefore has gain equal to 0%); (ii) the further gain in efficiency due to the
adoption of a random strategy after the transient (correspondent to the max-
imum values reached in Fig.12); (iii) the total number of dismissals (Nd); (iv)
the total number of retirements (Nr); (v) the total number of promotions (Np).
On the other hand, in Table 2 we report, again for both the topologies and for
all the percentages of random promotions, the total number of agents which
terminated their career (due to dismissal or retirement) at each one of the 5
levels of the organization, i.e., respectively (from left to right), N5, N4, N3,
N2, N1.
Looking at these Tables we immediately notice something strange. In fact,
from the last three columns of Table 1 one sees that, while the total number
of dismissals and retirements in the 20 years is almost the same independently
of the topology, the number of promotions is quite different in the two cases
and it results to be always greater in the ’neighbors’ mode (i.e. for a modular
organization) of about 30 units on average. Such a result sounds paradoxi-
cal because, at first glance, the total number of promotions, Np, should be
strictly correlated with the total number of dismissals and retirements at lev-
els 4, 3, 2, 1 (quantified by N4, N3, N2, N1). Actually, from Tables 1 and 2,
it results that, for each percentage of random promotions and for both the
topologies, it is always
Np = N4 + (N3 · 2) + (N2 · 3) + (N1 · 4) (3)
since every dismissal or retirement causes, in turn, a cascade of promotions
depending on the level at which it occurs (the more numerous the higher the
level). On the other hand, it is also evident that, independently of the topology,
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Global Mode - % of rnd prom. Trans.Eff.Gain Rnd.Eff.Gain Nd Nr Np
0% 0.00% 0.36% 22 206 84
25% 0.00% 1.01% 22 205 94
50% 0.00% 2.37% 20 206 96
75% 0.00% 3.80% 24 209 111
100% 0.00% 5.25% 23 204 116
Neigh. Mode - % of rnd prom. Trans.Eff.Gain Rnd.Eff.Gain Nd Nr Np
0% 2.70% 0.14% 22 203 135
25% 2.70% 1.12% 24 204 136
50% 2.70% 1.42% 23 204 138
75% 2.70% 2.83% 25 201 144
100% 2.70% 3.70% 25 202 146
Table 1
With reference to the simulations plotted in Fig.12 we report, from left to right, the
percentage of random promotions in ’global’ mode (upper panel) and in ’neighbors’
mode (lower panel); the gain in efficiency accumulated during to the meritocratic
transient (calculated with respect to the ’global’ mode); the further gain in efficiency
due to the adoption of a random strategy after the transient; the total number of
dismissals; the total number of retirements; the total number of promotions. See text
for further details.
it must always be
Nd +Nr = N5 +N4 +N3 +N2 +N1. (4)
Therefore, comparing equations (3) and (4), the explanation of why Np is
so sensitive to the topology, while Nd and Nr are not, seems to lie in the
different role played by the bottom level 5, since only in this level a dismissal
or a retirement do not translate into a promotion but imply a new external
engagement. Actually, the value of N5 in the ’neighbors’ mode is always lower
of the correspondent value in the ’global’ mode (see Table 2) exactly of those
about 30 units that, as previously observed, in a modular organization are
more likely to be promoted to the next levels with respect to a pyramidal
structure.
The solution of this puzzle becomes clear if one looks to the ages of agents at
level 5, which (during the dynamics) are normally distributed around 40 years
independently of the topology, and those at the other levels. As a matter of
fact, it results that in a modular organization (’neighbors’ mode) members of
levels ≤ 4 are on average quite older than those of the bottom level 5, while
the same does not happen in a pyramidal topology (’global’ mode). Such a
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Global Mode - % of rnd prom. N5 N4 N3 N2 N1
0% 167 44 12 4 1
25% 161 46 14 4 2
50% 158 48 14 4 2
75% 155 54 17 5 2
100% 146 56 17 6 2
Neigh. Mode - % of rnd prom. N5 N4 N3 N2 N1
0% 133 61 21 8 2
25% 134 63 22 7 2
50% 132 63 23 7 2
75% 128 64 25 6 3
100% 128 65 24 7 3
Table 2
With reference to the simulations plotted in Fig.12 we report, from left to right,
for both ’global’ (upper panel)and ’neighbors’ (lower panel) modes and for all the
percentages of random promotions, the total number of agents which terminated
their career at each one of the 5 levels of the organization.
strange statistical effect can be explained with an argument similar to that
used in subsection 3.1, since in ’neighbors’ mode the choice of the candidate
to be promoted is carried out on a much smaller sample (of the order of a
few units) than in the ’global’ mode, so it is very likely that the tails of the
age distribution will almost always excluded, and the age of the promoted
members will be closer to the average, i.e. 40 years old. This implies a greater
number of retirements at levels ≤ 4 with respect to level 5 in ’neighbors’ mode
(despite the fact that the total number Nr is similar for both the topologies)
and, in turn, implies the observed greater number of promotions Np for the
modular topology.
In conclusion, it seems that the mere fact of adopting a modular structure,
instead of a pyramidal one, increases not only the efficiency of the organization
in a meritocratic regime of promotions (see the first column of Table 1), but
also the probability of career advancements for its members. Therefore it seems
that a complex hierarchical and modular topology is convenient both from a
global and an individual point of view. Finally, we notice that the total number
of promotions Np grows even further also by increasing the percentage of
random promotions for both the topologies, thus definitively confirming the
advantage of using a random strategy for any kind of organization (if the Peter
hypothesis holds).
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4.2 Real applications of random promotion strategies
Let us now discuss the possibility of real applications of a random promotion
strategy. A frequent objection to the adoption of a random promotion strat-
egy, by a company or a public administration, concerns the possible negative
psychological feedback of employees to a denied and expected promotion. It
is true that, for the sake of simplicity, we did not consider any possibility of
this kind in our simulations. But, on one hand, in a very big company it is
very likely that the employees do completely ignore the promotion strategies
of their managers, therefore these effects could have a very minimal influence
on their work. On the other hand, we think that the most important point
which emerges from our work is the necessity to distinguish promotions from
rewards and incentives for the good work done. Actually, if the best employ-
ees understandably expect a prize for their work, such a prize, which from an
individual perspective is necessary for the purpose of preventing a decrease in
competence (see also the Prince Charles syndrome), does not necessarily have
to coincide with a promotion. On the contrary, receiving an increase in the
salary or more responsibility or more freedom in the time schedule, could be
very often a much more appreciated reward for an excellent performance. Thus
we explicitly suggest to accompany random promotions with prize/rewards to
the best members, in order to prevent psychological side effects. As a matter
of fact, it is not difficult to understand that if someone is the best for a certain
role, it is much better to try to keep him/her in that position instead of risking
to change his/her task or role, a change that, if the Peter hypothesis holds,
could expose the company to the risk of a decrease in efficiency. For example,
it is surely much better to keep an excellent surgeon in his/her position in-
stead of promoting him/her as the main director of the hospital, which is a
managerial role: in so doing we risk to have a double loss, i.e. a less competent
new director and a less competent new surgeon!
But, once established that for a given organization the meritocratic strat-
egy is a loosing one if the Peter hypothesis holds, why random promotions
should be better? Of course, an immediate answer is that promoting people
at random prevents the change of role of the best members with certainty,
thus circumventing the Peter effect. On the other hand, it is not easy to un-
derstand analytically this result in detail, since the effect is a cooperative
emergent feature of the numerical simulations. We suspect that such an effect
could have many similarities with the Parrondo paradox [28], where the noise
has a constructive role. Also in physics there are many examples where noise
has a positive influence [29,30,31,32,33] and actually this was the hint that
stimulated us in trying this possibility to bypass the Peter principle. However,
apart from physics, there are other analogies in nature in favor of this strategy
and one of them is for sure natural selection. In fact during the evolution, nat-
ural selection proceeds through random mutations and not through something
like top-down meritocratic promotions. If a random mutation reveals to give a
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great advantage for some species, then it is maintained and reinforced, never
changed or removed on purpose. Moreover mixing genes is surely positive for
species health and survival.
In addition to these arguments, a random strategy of promotions has also
other advantages which provide further benefits. In fact a random selection
can favor the emergence of hidden skills of the less competent employees,
which otherwise could have had very few probabilities to be appreciated. A
famous example in this direction, extracted from another field, is the case of
the well-known Opera singer Maria Callas. Her great turning point in career
occurred in 1949 in Venice when she was chosen, by chance and all of a sudden,
to substitute the main singer, who had fallen ill [34], in a role she had never
interpreted, in the opera ”I Puritani”. Something similar happened also to the
famous orchestra conductor Arturo Toscanini, who debuted as a conductor at
the age of 19 years old just by chance, forced to substitute the official one
who abandoned the orchestra (where Toscanini played as musician) during a
tourne´e in south America[35].
But there are also other justifications for the practical use of a random selec-
tion of candidates. Not infrequently, especially in the public administration,
the meritocratic regime does not represent the main criterium chosen for pro-
moting people: relatives or friends with very minimal competence are often
preferred for promotion to higher levels, without any relation to competence.
In this case a random selection of candidates may have the merit of disrupting
this very bad practice which for sure decreases the organization efficiency more
than any meritocratic promotion. In this respect, Phedon Nicolaides [36], af-
ter reading our first paper, recently expressed his personal point view on our
proposal by considering a random choice for the committees that should se-
lect employees for promotion. In our opinion this could also be a successful
strategy, although we have not done any simulation in this direction.
At this point it would be interesting to put in practice and test our proposal
in the real world to have an experimental proof, beyond simulations, of its
validity and we hope to collaborate with private companies in this respect in
the near future. Of course, in order to do so, our proposal needs to be adapted
to real organizations, with a given topology, which could differ from case to
case. But we have recently discovered that, as far as we know, there is at least
a well known case where a strategy similar to what we propose has been put
in practice with success. This is the case of the SEMCO company in Brazil
[37]. In the 80’s this company was saved from bankruptcy by Ricardo Semler,
who took the role of CEO substituting his father. Semler, by adopting a very
innovative way of management based on tasks rotation, on a system of rewards
and on a very limited role of hierarchy, invented a new strategy which revealed
to be very successful and increased the number of employees from 90 to 3000.
Today Semler is one of the new guru of management who gives lectures at
the Harvard Business School and in other prestigious institutions around the
world. The new Semco way is not exactly equivalent to what we propose, but
it is very similar in many respects and provides an interesting example of how
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new ways of management, apparently eccentric and not based on a simple and
naively meritocratic regime, are not only possible but, above all, convenient.
Finally, before closing this discussion, we would like to mention another possi-
ble application of our random strategy to political elections. When democracy
was invented in the old times in Athens [38] political representatives were
sorted at random and not elected. An election system based on a refined lot-
tery was adopted in the past for choosing the Doge in Venice [39] and similar
systems were adopted in the past in other parts of Italy. So it would be quite
interesting to see if a random selection of political representative would really
improve the efficiency of a parliament. This idea has regained some strength
also recently with the proposal in this direction of popular juries, that should
control the work of politicians, by Se´gole´ne Royal in France [40], or with the
proposal of Barnett and Carty for a radical reform of the House of Lords by a
random election [41]. Stimulated by these examples we have started to work in
this direction with numerical simulations. Our results seem very encouraging
and favor the adoption of a random choice of representatives for enhancing
the efficiency of a parliament, but they will be reported elsewere[42].
5 Conclusions
We have explored in a more realistic model of hierarchical organization, within
an agent-based simulation approach, the negative effects of the Peter principle
and possible strategies to contrast them. Our results confirm the robustness
of our previous findings, providing further support to our claim that a ran-
dom strategy seems to be a very simple and interesting way to increase the
efficiency of any real organization for which the Peter hypothesis of uncorre-
lated competence transmission holds. As discussed in the paper, the random
selection not necessarily should be completely random to be successful, since
a percentage of even 50% of random selection provides already a good ad-
vantage with respect to a full ”naively” meritocratic regime of promotions.
On the other hand, it is also true that no psychological effects of random
promotions have been taken into account in our simulations and that these
could be non-negligible for real organizations. We will surely consider them in
future studies, but, anyway, we believe that a random selection with different
possible refinements (as suggested for example in [36]) could be an interesting
promotion strategy to improve the performance of a hierarchical organization,
not only to contrast the Peter principle effects but also nepotism and cor-
ruption. In general a rotation of tasks, which is a very similar possibility to
the one we propose, has already been applied successfully at least in a real
case, i.e. the SEMCO company [37]. We therefore believe that our study is
not merely an academic out-of-the world proposal and could have useful and
relevant practical implications. In this respect, an experimental test in a real
24
system is very welcome and we hope to present soon, in a future study, some
first concrete results in this direction.
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